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Usury and Consumer Credit
Consumer credit has increased at an astounding rate in this
country during the Twentieth Century. From 1945 to the end of
1966 consumer, credit outstanding increased from $5 billion' to
$95 billion, 2 growing 41/2 times faster than our economy as a whole.'
Americans paid $13 billion in 1966 for the privilege of deferring
payments for consumer goods.' As a result of this expansion of
credit, an increasing number of debtors, ignorant of proper methods
of financing have been left in bankruptcy.' To avoid chaotic financial
conditions, it is obvious that some appropriate forms of credit
control are imperative.
Interest rates responding to the pressures of supply and demand
have fluctuated greatly over many centuries. In the present century,
interest rates have ranged from the highest to the lowest in the entire
span of history: from 10,000% reported in Berlin to .01% reported
in New York-a range of 1 million to 16 Today, in the United
States, all states have statutes pertaining to interest rates. There are
statutes which imply a rate of interest, where none is expressed in
the contract, varying from a low of 4% per annum in North Dakota,
to a high of 7% in California, Georgia and Nevada, with 6% per
annum being the most common rate. All but three states, Maine,
New Hampshire and Massachusetts, limit the amount of interest
that parties may agree upon in a loan; these limits run from 4%
per annum in North Dakota to 30% per annum in Rhode Island
with the 6% - 12% per annum range being the most popular. For
violation of the maximum limitation, the lender's penalties vary from
forfeiture of the excessive interest, to forfeiture of all interest, to
forfeiture of both principal and interest. 7 Courts are generally in
agreement as to the necessary elements to constitute a violation
of maximum interest statutes; i.e., 1.) a loan or forbearance of
money, 2.) an agreement to return money absolutely, 3.) an agreement to pay in excess of the lawful rate, and 4.) an unlawful interest."
'FED. RESERVE BULL. 88 (Jan. 1964).
2
Proxmire, Consumer Credit and the Law,
3
4

STUDENT

L.J. 5 (Sept. 1967).

id.

Id.
- Cavanaugh, Retail Credit Sales and Usury, 24 LA. L. REV. 822 (1964).
6 Jordan and Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit,
8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 441 (1967).
7 B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 15 (1st ed.
1965) [hereinafter cited as CURRAN].
8 In re Bibbey, 9 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1925); Equitable Credit & Discount
Corp. v. Geir, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941); Foley, Usury Laws as Applied
to Credit Sales-The Need for Revision, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 42, 43 (1960).
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Modem usury statutes exist primarily to protect the naive borrower;9 but what about the naive consumer who purchases on credit?
Is he protected by the usury statutes or any other form of legislation?
Usury statutes have generally been held inapplicable to credit
sales,"0 thereby reducing their effectiveness in protecting the needy
from the unscrupulous. Under the "Time Price" doctrine, a vendor
can sell his merchandise at one price for cash and at a higher price
on credit with the difference in price being compensation to the
vendor for his increased risk in the credit sale." The difference in
price spread over the period of credit extended may give the vendor
a greater return than the legal interest rate, but that is of no consequence under the "Time Price" doctrine, because "a credit sale is
considered conceptually different from either a loan or forebearance
of debt .... ,12
Therefore, if a consumer borrows money to purchase a consumer
good and pays interest exceeding the legal rate, he will be protected
by usury laws, but if the consumer purchases from the vendor and
pays a credit price which exceeds the cash price in the same amount
as the interest paid on the loan, he would not be protected under
the usury laws. Although it may be difficult to understand why
usury laws should not apply in both instances, judicial attitude
towards consumers and borrowers as evidenced by the opinion of
one court might help explain this paradox: "a purchaser is not like
the needy borrower, a victim of a rapacious lender, since he can
refrain from the purchase if he does not choose to pay the price asked
by the seller."' 3
In recent years, two states, Arkansas and Nebraska, have faced
reality by recognizing that vendor-vendee situations involve a loan
or forebearance of money and should be regulated by the state's
usury laws.
9 First Nat'l Bank of Opp v. Cotton, 231 Ala. 288, 164 So. 371 (1935);
Merriman and Hanks, Revising State Usury Statutes in Light of a Tight
Money Market, 27 MD. L. REv. 1, 8 (1967). See also Shanks, Practical
Problems in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L. REv. 327

(1967).

10 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Midwest Chevrolet Co., 66 F.2d
1 (10th Cir. 1933); Dunn v. Midland Loan Fin. Corp., 206 Minn. 550, 289
N.W. 411 (1939); Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945).
" General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262
S.W. 425 (1924).
12 Cavanaugh, supra note 5, at 824.
13 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262

S.W. 425 (1924).
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In 1952, the Arkansas Supreme Court was faced with a typical
vendor-vendee situation where usury was presented as a defense by
the vendee." In this case, involving the sale of an automobile on
credit, the vendee was charged interest at a rate exceeding that
state's maximum of 10%.'" Immediately after the transaction was
completed, the vendor transfered the commercial paper to the
defendant, General Contract Purchase Corporation, against whom
the defense of usury was posed. The Arkansas court upheld this
transaction under the "Time Price" doctrine since the parties had
relied upon existing case law which upheld the doctrine, but the
court gave a caveat that any future cases like this one would be
scrutinized to make certain the transaction was a bona fide credit
sale instead of a disguise of usury. 6 The court indicated that if the
vendor charged more than the maximum rate to the vendee with the
intention and assurance of transfering the commercial paper to a
finance company and extracted more than the 10% rate, the transaction would be treated as a loan, thereby coming within the purview
of the usury limitation. In a later decision," r the Arkansas court
applied the usury restriction to a credit sale which did not involve
the third party finance company as in the earlier case. This case
was merely a vendor-vendee credit sale with the vendor retaining
the commercial paper. Although the vendor did not transfer the
paper to a third party, and it was a bona fide credit sale, usury
was held to be a good defense because the finance charge exceeded
the lawful interest rate. Thus the court recognized that the difference
between the cash price and the credit price amounts to interest paid
by the vendee for the vendor's forebearance of debt.
From these and other related cases, it is clear that Arkansas has
completely repudiated the "Time Price" doctrine and has faced the
credit sale problem squarely by calling the so-called "Time Price
Differential" interest, and as such, subject to usury limitations.
Nebraska has faced reality in ignoring the "Time Place" doctrine
by applying usury to credit sales. In a 1957 decision,' 8 the Nebraska
court indicated that if the vendee were not quoted a cash price
4 Hare

v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d

973 (1952).
5

AEK.CONST. art. XIX, § 13 (1874).
Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d
973 (1952).
17 Sloan v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1958).
, McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957).
1

16
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and a credit price, and given a choice between the two, the finance
charge would be treated as interest to which usury would be
applicable, and, if in excess of the maximum rate, the vendee would
have a good defense, even against the third party finance company
holding the commercial paper, by treating the vendee as agent of
the finance company. In a subsequent case, 9 involving a credit
sale under that state's retail installment sales act which allowed
finance charges in excess of the usury statute, the court held the
installment sales act to be unconstitutional, and the "Time Price
Differential" as interest for the forebearance of money in excess
of the general usury statute. In still a later case,2" the same court
continued to apply usury limitations to credit sales by accepting
the fact that when the vendor in a time sale computes the credit price
by applying a rate to the cash price, the difference between the two
prices is interest paid to the vendor for his forebearance from
collecting the debt, and, therefore, subject to usury laws. These
cases applying usury laws to credit sales clearly show Nebraska's
repudiation of the "Time Price" doctrine.
In addition to the "Time Price" doctrine, there are also other
exceptions to the application of usury statutes. One example is the
denial of the defense of usury to corporations."1 Some courts will
overlook the corporate exception and apply the usury laws where
it is evident that the lender and borrower have engaged in collusion
to set up a corporation for the borrower so that excessive interest
rates may be charged.22 Other courts allow the corporate exception
to stand if there is a validly existing corporation set up in accordance
with the statutes of the state even though the main purpose of the
corporation is to allow the incorporators to borrow money paying
interest in excess of the maximum rate.2 3 The basis for allowing the
corporate exception is that corporations are more sophisticated than
individuals in the matter of borrowing; therefore, they are less likely
to need protection. 4
Another method used to obtain effective interest in excess of the
maximum rate prescribed by law is the "discount" or "discount and
Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963).
Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963).
21 E.g., W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 10 (Michie 1966).
22 E.g., Gelber v. Kugers Tavern, Inc., 10 N.J. 191, 89 A.2d 654 (1952).
23 E.g., Wergner v. Haines Corp., 302 N.Y. 930, 100 N.E.2d 189 (1951);
Rabinowich v. Eliasberg, 159 Md. 655, 152 A. 437 (1930).
24 Merriman and Hanks, Revising State Usury Statutes in Light of a
Tight Money Market, 27 MD. L. REv. 1, 9 (1967).
19
20
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repayment in installment" method devised by Arthur Morris in
1910.25 Under this method the principal and time period are
determined; then, by using the maximum interest allowed by statute,
the total interest for the period is calculated. Interest is deducted
from the principal and the resulting amount is given to the consumer
with him paying the full amount of principal at the end of the
period. In effect, the principal, for example $100, is used to compute
the amount of interest although the borrower receives the discounted
amount, for example $94, based on 6%. The result is that the
borrower pays interest on $100 but uses only $94 thereby increasing
the effective rate of interest over 6%. Along with this procedure
lenders may require that the principal be paid back in equal installments or as under the Morris Plan, the borrower deposits equal
sums monthly so that at the maturity date of the loan the loan will
be fully paid. Under this repayment procedure, the borrower has
the use on the average for the period of the loan, of less than
one-half of the principal while paying interest computed upon an
amount never received. It should also be noted that the borrower
receives no interest on these early payments although he is at the
same time being charged for money he is not using. For an example
of the operation of this principal, if a borrower asks for $600 for one
year with existing maximum interest rate of 6% he would receive
$600 less $36 interest or $564. Already it is easy to see that interest
is being computed on $600 while the borrower is afforded only
$564 to use. If the principal is to be repaid in equal installments
of $50 monthly, the borrower has the use of less than $300 on the
average, yet he is paying interest computed on $600. Thus, the
ultimate effect is that the effective rate yielded to the lender is more
than 12%, or twice the maximum rate. Yet, courts have generally
held that these methods do not violate usury laws.2 6
All states, except Arkansas, realizing the high risk in small loans
to consumers, have enacted Small Loan laws2" patterned after the
Uniform Small Loan Act drafted by the Russell Sage Foundation
in 1916." s Under these acts the borrower is allowed to charge
interest in excess of that allowed by usury laws with the rate being
expressed in monthly terms-for example, a monthly rate of 31/2 %
producing a yearly rate of 42%29 Lenders first must apply for a
CURRAN 6, 52 et seq.; Proxmire, supra note 2, at 6.
CURRAN 52 et seq.
E.g., W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 7a (Michie 1966).
26 CURRAN 16.
29 Proxmire, supra note 2, at 6.

25

26
27
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license issued by the particular state, and, after acquiring the license,
they will usually be under strict supervision. The amount of loans
generally is limited to $300, and the lender is required to disclose
all charges to the borrower. Interest is to be computed on the unpaid
monthly balance so the discount problem is eliminated. These laws
make the small loan business inviting to lenders who would otherwise
receive a much smaller return on their capital or resort to violation
of usury laws."0
Most states have retail installment sales acts, and all but one
state, Tennessee, appear to have motor vehicle installment sales
legislation.' Many of these statutes, which require disclosure of
charges to the consumer, also provide for interest in excess of the
rate expressed in general usury statutes. But, as was noted earlier,
because of the excessive interest rate allowed, one court held such
an act unconstitutional.32 If the courts will not apply usury statutes
to credit sales, then retail installment sales acts which require
disclosure of the charges are probably the next best method of
protecting the consumer. If the consumer is made aware of the costs
of financing, he will be better able to determine which merchant is
offering the best deal. But, as indicated by Senator Proxmire, because
of the different methods of calculating interest and finance charges,
what starts out at 6% per year may cost over 13% in the end.33
What is the proper way for government to protect the unwise
consumer from the unscrupulous lender or seller? Senator Proxmire
has a solution in his Truth in Lending Bill 4 and the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws have a solution in their Uniform Consumer
Credit Code.35
Proxmire's Truth in Lending Bill is designed to protect the consumer by means of disclosure by the lender or seller rather than by
setting a maximum interest rate. This proposal covers all credit
transactions except the following: credit extended for business or
commercial purposes or to governmental agencies or instrumentalities;
transactions with broker-dealers registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission; transactions other than in real estate when
30 CunAN

52 et seq.

93.
Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963).
33 See Proxnire, supra note 2, at 8 for a discussion of different methods
of computing finance charges.
34 S. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
35 CREDrr CODE (Ten. Draft No. 2 1967).
31 CURRAN
32
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the amount to be financed exceeds $25,000; and transactions
involving first mortgages on real estate.
Under the provision related to regular credit sales, the seller
must inform the purchaser of: the cash price for the goods; the
down payment including trade-ins; all charges other than finance
charges; the total amount to be financed; the amount of the finance
charge; the finance charge expressed as an annual rate if $10 or
more; the number, amount, and due dates of payments; and default
or delinquency charges due to late payments.
In relation to an actual loan of money the lender must state: the
amount of credit of which the borrower will have actual use; all
charges except the finance charge; the total amount to be financed;
the finance charge stated as an annual rate if $10 or more; the
number, amount and due dates of payments; and default or delinquency charges due to late payments.
For open end credit accounts, the creditor must state: conditions
under which a finance charge will be imposed and the period within
which payment may be made without incurring a finance charge;
the method used to determine the balance upon which the finance
charge will be computed; the percentage rate per period and per
annum and any minimum or fixed finance charge; and at what times
other charges may be imposed and the method for determining
them. In addition, at the end of each billing cycle the creditor must
show: the outstanding balance at the beginning of the period; amount
and date of each purchase or extension of credit; amount credited
during the period; finance charge for that period and the amount of
a fixed or minimum charge, if any; the balance on which the finance
charge was computed and how that balance was determined; the
rate used to determine the finance charge including the annual
rate; balance in the account at the end of the period; and at what
times payment must be made to avoid additional finance charges.
All this information, except that provided at the end of the billing
cycle, must be given to the borrower before credit is extended to him.
By using the information afforded to him the potential debtor
should be able to evaluate and use the credit available to him more
wisely. Senator Proxmire stated that the purpose of the Truth in
Lending Bill is "to convert this jumble of finance rates into a simple
measure which the consumer can understand and use to make
comparisons." 36 The Senator feels that the problem existing in the
6 Proxmire, supra note 2, at 8.
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present consumer credit industry would be eased somewhat by a
national law requiring disclosure of rates and methods of computing
finance charges. 7 What better way can the consumer be educated?
The following discussion of the proposed Uniform Consumer
Credit Code will merely touch upon some of its main sections dealing
with credit sales.
A consumer credit sale is defined as "a sale of goods or services
• .. in which credit is granted by a seller who regularly engages in

credit transactions as a seller, the buyer is a person other than an
organization, and the goods or services are purchased either primarily
for a personal, family, or household purpose or primarily for a
farming purpose and the amount financed is $10,000 or less."3
By this definition, the Code covers most consumer transactions on
the ordinary non-business level.
Similar to the Truth in Lending Bill, the Credit Code provides
for disclosure of finance charges, but unlike the Proxmire bill the
Credit Code provides for maximum rates to be charged for financing.
Maximum rates to be charged on credit sales other than retail charge
accounts are either $18 per $100 per year on the amount below
$300, $12 per $100 on the amount between $300 and $1,000, and
$8 per $100 on the amount in excess of $1,000, or 18% per year
calculated on the unpaid balance of the amount financed. For
retail charge accounts the maximum finance charges are 2% of the
unpaid balance of $500 or less, and 11/2% of the unpaid balance
in excess of $500 with a minimum charge of $.70 for monthly billing
cycles. For cycles different from monthly, a proportionate rate
should be used.
Disclosure provisions of the Credit Code, similar to those of the
Truth in Lending Bill, require the creditor to make available to
the debtor much important data concerning the cost of credit. When
sales other than retail charge accounts are involved, the Credit Code
requires the creditor to state to the debtor: description of the goods;
cash price of the goods; amount of down payment including trade-ins;
registration, certificate of title or license fees; description of insurance
to be paid for by seller; additional charges; amount financed; amount
of the credit service charge; unpaid balance; and the number, amount
and due date of first payment and due date of subsequent payments.
37
38

Id. at 11.

CREDIT CODE §

2.104 (Ten. Draft No. 2 1967).
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If the amount financed exceeds $300, the creditor must provide the
debtor with an approximate rate of the service charge. For retail
charge accounts, the seller must state to the purchaser: balance at
beginning of cycle; amount of credits; cash price of goods charged
to the account during the cycle; amount of service and other charges;
balance at end of cycle; amount to be currently paid to avoid
delinquency; and at what times service or other charges may be made
and the manner in which they are calculated.
Other disclosure requirements of the Credit Code concern rate
calculation and advertising. Sellers are required to give the rate
charged as a service charge stated in terms of dollars per $100 per
year. For regular scheduled payments, there is a formula provided
to determine the rate per billing period. Creditors in their advertisements are required to disclose the rate of the service charge in dollars
per $100 per year, and, if installment payments are involved, the
number and amount of installments. Information required to be
disclosed by the Credit Code must be given in writing before the
sale or within a reasonable time thereafter.
In comparing the Truth in Lending Bill and the Credit Code it
appears that the main difference is that the Code sets maximum
charges to be made while the Bill is silent on this point. The reason
for this difference might properly be explained by Senator Proxmire's
belief that state legislation properly deals with fixing rate ceilings. 9
Both proposals are primarily concerned with providing the consumer
the information needed to show what the actual cost of financing an
article will be. If the consumer has this information, it would seem
that government has certainly helped to protect him.
There have been usury laws to protect the debtor for many
centuries, but courts have refused to use these laws to protect
consumers because the two have been considered conceptually different. Today, because of the tremendous amount of credit sales in
this country, it is evident that almost everyone resorts to some form
of credit buying. Both government and private institutions have
recognized the need to protect the consumer from those creditors
whose practices are deceptive and have pushed forward to provide
legislation covering the consumer credit field. Both pieces of proposed
legislation examined assume that an effective method to protect the
39 Proxmire, supra note 2, at 11.
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consumer is to make him aware of the cost of the choice between
cash or credit sale.
Whether the best method to cope with the problem of consumer
credit is on the state or national level is beyond the scope of this
article, but any method chosen will probably set up uniform laws
concerning disclosure of costs. For government to make the consumer aware of costs of credit will be a great step forward and also
a proper step without infringing upon legitimate endeavors of
private enterprise.
William Douglass Goodwin
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